Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 55 | Number 3

Article 3

10-7-2015

Arbitrage Risk and Market Efficiency - Applications
to Securities Class Actions
Rajeev R. Bhattacharya
Stephen J. O'Brien

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Rajeev R. Bhattacharya and Stephen J. O'Brien, Arbitrage Risk and Market Efficiency - Applications to Securities Class Actions, 55 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 643 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

ARBITRAGE RISK AND MARKET EFFICIENCY—
APPLICATIONS TO SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS
Rajeev R. Bhattacharya & Stephen J. O’Brien*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................... 643
I.Market Efficiency and Securities Class Actions ......... 648
II.Arbitrage Risk as a Negative Proxy for Market
Efficiency ............................................................... 653
III.Relation of Arbitrage Risk to Standard Factors:
Empirical Findings ............................................... 661
A. Trading Volume .............................................. 665
B. The Number of Market Makers ..................... 666
C. Serial Correlation ........................................... 667
D. Other Factors.................................................. 667
Conclusions ..................................................................... 668
INTRODUCTION
Market efficiency has been widely studied in the field of
finance for decades, as it provides an investor with a sense of
how well the price signal works at conveying all available
information, and thus informs an investor of the necessity to
acquire additional information about the firm issuing the
security. 1 Market efficiency has gained acceptance within the
* The authors sincerely appreciate the detailed comments provided by
Reena Aggarwal, Glenn Davis, John Davis, S.P. Kothari, Robert MacLaverty,
Leslie Marx, Michael McDonald, David Nelson, Rebecca Nelson, Edward O’Brien,
Jeffrey Pontiff, Terence Rodgers, Stephen Rovak, Hersh Shefrin, Erik Sirri,
Dennis Staats, Robert Thompson, Paul Wazzan, and Simon Wheatley. The
authors, of course, take full responsibility for all opinions and errors. The
organizations with which the authors and reviewers are affiliated do not
necessarily endorse or share the opinions or conclusions of this paper.
1. For some of the myriad academic research on market efficiency and its
tests, see, e.g., Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Bradford Cornell, Spot Rates, Forward
Rates and Exchange Market Efficiency, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 55 (1977); Michael
Brennan & Eduardo Schwartz, An Equilibrium Model of Bond Pricing and a Test
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court system as a means of facilitating proof in securities fraud
litigation. In particular, in the 1988 case of Basic v. Levinson,
the United States Supreme Court firmly established the fraudon-the-market theory as a means for securities fraud plaintiffs
to satisfy the legal element that they had relied upon a
material misrepresentation or omission in purchasing or
selling a security. While the courts have recently reexamined
whether the legal sector’s use of the efficient market theory is
justified, it remains firmly entrenched in judicial analysis.
Thus detailed economic analysis of market efficiency will
continue to play a significant role in securities cases.
Because reliance is a required element of securities fraud
cases and because class action procedures generally require
that plaintiffs show that reliance can be proven on a class-wide
basis, courts most frequently assess market efficiency at the
class certification stage of securities fraud cases—the point at
which the court determines if the plaintiffs’ claims are best
tried individually or whether numerous plaintiffs can
collectively pursue essentially the same claim against the
defendant at the same time. 2 Trial courts thus devote
significant time and energy to determinations about market
efficiency in deciding whether to certify a case for class action
treatment.
In Cammer v. Bloom (D. N.J. 1989), the federal district
court enumerated several factors for determining market
efficiency of the securities in question: (1) the average weekly
trading volume, (2) the number of security analysts following
and reporting on the security, (3) the extent to which market
of Market Efficiency, 17 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 301 (1982); Gerald
Dwyer & Myles Wallace, Cointegration and Market Efficiency, 11 J. INT’L MONEY
& FIN. 318 (1992); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 100 VA L. REV. 313 (1984); Michael Jensen, Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978); S.P. Kothari,
Capital Markets Research in Accounting, 31 J. ECON. & ACCT. 105 (2001); Tim
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Uniformly Least Powerful Tests of Market Efficiency, 55
J. FIN. ECON. 361 (2000); “Efficient Market Hypothesis.” NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 739–42 (1st ed. 1992); Burton Malkiel, The
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERP. 59 (2003); Rafael
Porta, Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Good News for Value
Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency, 52 J. FIN. 859 (1997); Richard Roll,
A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market,
39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984); Paul Samuelson, An Enjoyable Life Puzzling Over Modern
Finance Theory, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.. 19 (2009); Robert Shiller, The Use of
Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291 (1981).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Halliburton Co. v. Erica Pl John Fund, Inc., ___
U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407–08, 2412, 2415–16 (2014).
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makers traded the security, (4) the issuer’s eligibility to file an
SEC registration Form S-3, and (5) the cause-and-effect
relationship between material disclosures and changes in the
security’s price. 3 These “Cammer factors” have been adopted
by a number of courts, while still other courts have added other
factors. 4 For instance, one court considered the company’s
market capitalization and the size of the public float for the
security, while another considered the ability to sell short the
security and the level of autocorrelation between the security’s
prices. 5
From finance theory, the market for a security is said to
be “semistrong form efficient” if the price of the security
reflects all publicly available information. Prices of securities
reflect, albeit to varying extents, all publicly available
information; therefore, markets for securities are semistrong
form efficient in varying degrees. Much research has also been
done to determine the mechanisms by which the pricing signal
operates, and it is widely understood that correction of
mispricing of a stock primarily occurs through arbitrage
activity. 6
Since arbitrage is not a cost-free activity, and because
frictions remain, whether in the form of transaction costs,
idiosyncratic risk, or other costs and risks associated with
trading securities, pricing anomalies may persist. 7 As a result,
everything else remaining the same, financial economics tells
us that the market for a stock with a higher arbitrage cost will
be less efficient—i.e., a stock’s market efficiency is negatively
related to its arbitrage risk. 8 Thus, we refer to arbitrage risk
3. 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87.
4. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d
196, 204–05 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508
(1st Cir. 2005); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety
v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie,
184 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1999).
5. See Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001); In re
Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F. 3d 1, 18 n. 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
6. See, e.g., LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTICIONERS Ch. 10 & Ch. 17 (2003); Jeffrey Pontiff,
Costly Arbitrage and the Myth of Idiosyncratic Risk, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 35
(2006).
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly arbitrage and the myth of idiosyncratic
risk, J. ACCT. & ECON. (2006).
8. This implies that Market Efficiency Percentile – 1 = 100 – Arbitrage Risk
Percentile. For example, if a stock is at the 25th percentile for arbitrage risk,
then the stock is at the 76th percentile for market efficiency.
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as a negative proxy for market efficiency. We discuss this in
detail in Part II.
Consider an arbitrageur whose information suggests that
a stock is underpriced. The arbitrageur will then “go long” on
that stock (buy and hold the stock) in order to obtain arbitrage
profits by selling the stock at a later date. However, the
arbitrageur will also manage the risk of holding the stock by
hedging. As a result of our interviews with traders “in the
trenches,” we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal
hedge stocks and the optimal hedge ratios. The risk of this
optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the stock,
our negative proxy for market efficiency. We discuss these
calculations in detail.
We provide a methodology that can calculate the market
efficiency percentile of a stock over the relevant period, based
on the data for a comparable measurement period. 9 For
example, in Lefkoe, et al. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., where
the class period was January 5, 2006 to June 7, 2006, we used
August 1, 2005 to January 4, 2006, as the measurement period.
If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different
measurement period—e.g., if the period of interest
immediately follows an initial public offering (IPO)—then we
can do the calculations with the measurement period as the
relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk of
the security for the relevant period. For example, in a recent
securities class action filed against Groupon, Inc., the class
period was defined as November 4, 2011 to March 30, 2012.
Since the class period immediately follows the IPO, we do not
have trading data from a prior period to use as the
measurement period.
For this paper, we focus on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage
risk, but we do sensitivity analyses with ex post arbitrage risk
as another negative proxy for market efficiency. We apply this
methodology to calculate, on a yearly basis, the arbitrage risk
for each U.S. exchange-listed common stock from 1988 to 2010
(subject to certain restrictions). We also perform a regression
analysis of arbitrage risk (as a negative proxy of market
efficiency) on the factors identified by courts in securities class
actions. These results are summarized in Table 1. 10

9. We interpret comparability to mean a time interval that is proximate in
location and length.
10. We detail all the variables in Section 4. We use 5% as our level of
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Relation
with Market
Efficiency

Significance
at 5% Level

Consistency
with
“Conventional
Wisdom”

Negative

Significant

Inconsistent

Negative

Ambiguous

—

Negative

Significant

Inconsistent

Positive

Significant

Consistent

Negative

Significant

Consistent

Positive

Ambiguous

—

Positive

Significant

Consistent

Positive

Significant

Inconsistent

Positive

Significant

—

Negative

Significant

—

Factor
Cammer v.
Bloom
Turnover
Number of
Analysts
Number of
Nasdaq
Market
Makers
Unger v.
Amidesys
Market
Capitalization
Bid-Ask
Spread
Public Float
Ratio
Other
Institutional
Ownership
Ratio
Serial
Correlation
Explanatory
Power
Inclusion in
Dow Jones
Index

We checked the sensitivity of these results through a
number of additional analyses. For one set, we replaced
turnover with logarithm of volume (or logarithm of dollar
significance. If the significance results are different under homoscedasticity and
under heteroscedasticity-robustness, we refer to the significance as ambiguous;
Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980).
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volume) but removed market capitalization from the list of
factors, reflecting the fact that, ceteris paribus, the volume for
a stock with higher market capitalization will be higher. For
this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 1,
except that market efficiency was positively and significantly
affected by number of analysts; positively but insignificantly
affected by number of market makers (for Nasdaq stocks);
positively but ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and
positively and significantly affected by inclusion in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) (the latter makes sense
because in this set, market capitalization is not used as an
explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for the results
in Table 1). The second set uses only the Cammer factors as
explanatory variables. For this set, we found that the results
were the same as in Table 1, except that market efficiency is
positively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of volume
(or logarithm of dollar volume); and positively and significantly
affected by number of analysts.
In Part I, we detail the development and application of
market efficiency to securities class actions. In Part II, we
develop arbitrage risk as a negative proxy for market
efficiency. In Part III, we provide regression results that test
the various factors believed to determine market efficiency—
we also investigate the empirical findings that are apparently
inconsistent with “conventional wisdom” and show that the
empirical findings are actually consistent with the principles
of financial economics. Part IV concludes the paper.
I.

MARKET EFFICIENCY AND SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS

General acceptance of the relevance of the efficient market
hypothesis by the courts was confirmed with the case of Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory. But
to understand the courts’ use of market efficiency, it is
important first to understand what plaintiffs are required to
prove in establishing a securities fraud claim.
In a typical claim of securities fraud pursued under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, pl aintiffs must
prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by a
defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,

2015] ARBITRAGE RISK & MARKET EFFICIENCY

649

To justify
(5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation. 11
proceeding as a class action, instead of an individual’s claim,
plaintiffs must also show that (1) the potential class of affected
parties is so large that including them all individually is
impractical, (2) questions of law or fact are common to all
potential class members, (3) the claims of the named
representative are typical of the potential class, and (4) the
named representative can fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. 12 Additionally, plaintiffs must establish
at least one of the following: (1) that individual actions risk
inconsistent rulings, yielding incompatible standards of
conduct or risk impairing the rights of potential class members
not a part of the lawsuit, or (2) final injunctive or declarative
relief is appropriate, respecting the class as a whole, or (3) the
questions of law or fact common to the potential class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other methods
of adjudication. 13 This last requirement, known as the
predominance requirement, is frequently used to establish the
additional Rule 23(b) standard for class actions.
Until the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory in
Basic, it was difficult for plaintiffs to establish the reliance
element of their claim since they likely bought or sold the
underlying security without direct knowledge of the alleged
misrepresentation or omission. It was even more challenging
to establish that the evidence of reliance by all class members
was common to each of them, that all class members relied on
the same information and to the same degree in making their
securities purchases or sales. The fraud-on-the-market theory
was designed to address plaintiffs’ difficulties in establishing
reliance, with the added benefit that it provided a presumption
of reliance applicable to all investors of the security in
question.
The fraud-on-the-market theory avoids the pitfall facing
plaintiffs by providing them with a rebuttable presumption of
reliance upon the alleged misrepresentations so long as the
market for the underlying security is efficient. 14 The notion is
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of
11. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct.
1184, 1192 (2013).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
14. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2010).
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a security is determined by the publicly available information
about the underlying company, including the alleged
misrepresentation. 15
Assessment of market efficiency is generally first
presented at the class certification stage of securities fraud
cases, the point at which the court resolves whether the
plaintiffs’ claims are best tried individually or whether
numerous plaintiffs can collectively pursue essentially the
same claim against the defendant at the same time. At the
class certification stage, plaintiffs can present evidence that
they traded shares in an efficient market, and the court then
presumes that investors who traded securities in that market
relied on public, material misrepresentations regarding those
securities. 16 Defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance
by presenting evidence challenging actual reliance or market
efficiency. Based on the evidence presented, the court then
decides whether or not the matter can legitimately proceed as
a class action.
A class certification hearing is not a trial on the merits and
is often conducted before full discovery is completed, so
plaintiffs do not need to prove each of the claim elements on
the merits at the class certification stage. But plaintiffs are
required to prove—not simply plead—the Rule 23(a) class
action requirements and, most typically, that questions of law
or fact common to all class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members. 17 Over the years,
tensions have grown, however, as the proof required to
establish the class action requirements now frequently spills
over into the merits of the underlying claims themselves. The
courts are thus struggling to determine what and how much
information must be proven during class certification contests.
Amid two recent and significant 5-4 decisions reversing
class certification decisions because plaintiffs failed to prove
the requirements of Rule 23, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
___ (2013), the United States Supreme Court has now issued
three other significant decisions regarding securities class
actions cases that ultimately continue to support the 1988
15. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2181 (2011) (quoting Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988)).
16. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct.
1184, 1192 (2013).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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Basic decision even while demonstrating that the fraud-on-themarket theory and the efficient market theory increasingly are
coming under harsh attack.
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds, 568 U.S. ___ (2013), a 6-3 majority decided that the
materiality requirement of a securities claim was sufficiently
distinct from market efficiency and the public nature of
securities claims such that it did not have to be established at
the class certification stage. The Court reasoned that whether
a misrepresentation was sufficiently material to a stock price
was certainly a matter of common proof such that the courts do
not need to delve into the merits of this issue during class
certification. The Court essentially held that, while the parties
are presenting event studies that go to the reliance (and the
predominance of the common reliance evidence) to show that a
stock price effect exists, plaintiffs need not prove during class
certification that the stock price effect was material. Although
certainly implicit in Scalia’s short dissenting opinion, neither
his dissent nor the dissent of Thomas (joined by Scalia and
Kennedy) explicitly suggested that the Basic decision should
be overruled, presumably because that issue was not directly
before the Court.
Amgen is consistent with the Court’s unanimous decision
two years earlier in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., ___ U.S. ___ (2011), which held that plaintiffs need not
prove loss causation, that the misrepresentation in question
caused the plaintiffs’ economic loss, at the class certification
stage. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously ruled
in favor of Halliburton that plaintiffs’ proof of loss causation,
that company statements “actually caused the stock price to
fall and resulted in the losses,” was necessary to invoke the
Basic presumption of reliance. 18 Before the Supreme Court,
Halliburton also suggested that insufficient evidence existed
as to any price impact, thus suggesting there was nothing to
rely upon in order to invoke the Basic presumption. 19 The
Supreme Court refused to examine the economic evidence and
simply concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in conflating
loss causation with the reliance element and the Basic

18. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)
(citations omitted).
19. Id. at 2186.
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presumption of reliance. 20 The Court remanded the matter for
reconsideration of the trial court’s class certification decision.
Subsequently, the district court granted class certification,
which the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 21 Halliburton then appealed
to the Supreme Court and presented two issues. First and
foremost, the Court addressed whether the Basic presumption
of liability should be overruled, and thus whether plaintiffs
should be required to prove actual reliance, including whether
class-wide, common proof of reliance was now required at the
class certification stage of litigation. 22 Second, the Court
addressed the extent to which evidence of a presumption of
reliance could be rebutted by defendants at the class
certification stage, recognizing that class certification hearings
are not supposed to be trials on the merits but also recognizing
that the Court’s recent class action decisions place increasing
burdens on plaintiffs to prove (as oppose to presume) the class
action requirements of Rule 23. 23
The Supreme Court yet again unanimously vacated the
lower court rulings and instructed the trial court to re-examine
the evidence on class certification. 24 Five justices, led by Chief
Justice Roberts, determined that Halliburton should be given
an opportunity to rebut the Basic presumption of reliance by
presenting evidence of a lack of any price impact. 25 Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor concurred, recognizing that
the evidentiary burden of rebutting the Basic presumption
falls on defendants and thus should not be an additional hurdle
for class action plaintiffs. 26 Justices Thomas, Alito and Scalia
concurred in the result but suggested that Basic should now be
overruled, in part because “ ‘ overwhelming empirical evidence’
now suggests that even when markets do incorporate public
information, they often fail to do so accurately” and that
“ ‘ [s]cores’ of ‘efficiency-defying anomalies—such as market
swings in the absence of new information and prolonged
deviations from underlying asset values—make market

20. Id.
21. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2406 (2014).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2407.
24. Id. at 2417.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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efficiency ‘more contestable than ever.’ ” 27
Thus, the Basic presumption remains a fixture of federal
securities litigation even though the judicial system is now
amply aware of the debates within finance theory about the
extent and usefulness of the efficient market hypothesis.
Furthermore, the academic debates themselves will certainly
carry over into future class certification analyses as
Halliburton supports defendants’ efforts to garner evidence
and present their own event studies challenging the efficiency
of the information signals associated with plaintiffs’
allegations of misrepresentations.
Without doubt, federal district courts will continue to
conduct ever more rigorous reviews of market efficiency at the
class certification stage of securities lawsuits. The scope and
structure of these analyses are necessarily case-by-case, left
to the parties and their financial experts to present evidence
to the courts, with the courts then making legal
determinations about whether the pertinent markets were
“efficient enough” to justify the Basic presumption of reliance.
As such, we propose to use our methodology here to
examine the market efficiency factors that parties have
typically presented to the courts and upon which the courts
have relied in making their determinations. In addition to the
Cammer factors referred to earlier, such factors include
market capitalization, size of the public float, ability to sell
short the security, and level of autocorrelation between the
security’s prices. 28 Our results will shed light on whether
litigants and the courts are presenting evidence consistent
with the results of finance theory and empirics.
II.

ARBITRAGE RISK AS A NEGATIVE PROXY FOR
MARKET EFFICIENCY

Capital market efficiency describes how completely and

27. Id. at 2421.
28. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated in
part by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d
196, 204 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508–09
(1st Cir. 2005); In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 18 n.21 (1st Cir.
2005); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F. 3d
1059, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1999); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D.
Tex. 2001).
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accurately the pricing signal works. When all publicly
available information is reflected in a security’s price, the
market for the security is said to be semistrong form efficient. 29
We interpret the concept not as an either/or, binary construct,
but rather as a relative concept occurring along a continuum,
and thus one often refers to a market’s relative efficiency. 30
The pricing signal is thought to work through the actions of all
traders who, whatever their level of knowledge and
sophistication, convey their individual valuations to the
market through their buy and sell decisions at various price
points. 31 The collective actions of all traders thus push the
price of a particular security toward its market equilibrium
level, but do not necessarily take the market for the security
all the way to perfect semistrong form efficiency.
Arbitrageurs are investors who trade on information about
relative values. They trade investments that are or should be
fundamentally correlated but for which they believe the
market valuations are deviating from the fundamental
relation. Thus arbitrageurs attempt to take advantage of the
market
pricing
discrepancies
between
otherwise
fundamentally correlated securities in order to earn trading
profits. This activity of exploiting situations in which markets
are not efficient assists the pricing signal by conveying
information to the market and helping to push the market to
efficiency, but does not necessarily take the market all the way
to perfect semistrong form efficiency.
But as Pontiff explains, because of “costly arbitrage,”
arbitrageurs are unlikely to ever completely eliminate
mispricing. 32 He identifies two sources of arbitrage costs:
transactions costs (e.g., commissions, brokerage fees) and
holding costs (e.g., opportunity cost of capital and the
idiosyncratic risk of a security), and he stresses the importance
of idiosyncratic risk in making arbitrage a costly endeavor. 33
As arbitrageurs construct their hedge portfolios of
29. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 404 (1970); BURTON G. MALKIEL, Efficient
Market Hypothesis, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 322–
36 (P. Newman, M. Milgate, & J. Eatwell eds., 1st ed. 1987).
30. See, e.g., John Campbell, Andrew Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay, The
Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
(1997).
31. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 6, at chapters 10 and 17.
32. Pontiff, supra note 7, at 39–40.
33. Id. at 37, 41.
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investments, supposedly correlated in returns, they cannot
find perfectly positive correlations in returns and thus perfect
substitutes as investments (or perfectly negative correlations
in returns and perfect complements as investments), so they
are always exposed to the vagaries of each individual security
they hold. Even aggregated across a number of investment
positions within the hedge portfolio, the legs of the arbitrage,
arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the idiosyncratic risk of any
security.
As a result of the costs of arbitrage, including idiosyncratic
risk, market inefficiencies will always remain; the better
arbitrage works, the more efficient the market for a security is
likely to be. As a result, the costs of arbitrage for a security
provide a means to test the efficiency of the security.
Pontiff concludes that “idiosyncratic risk is the single
largest cost faced by arbitrageurs,” and that “idiosyncratic risk
is the single largest barrier to arbitrage.” 34 Our notion of
arbitrage risk is a generalization of the standard notion of
idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of
residuals from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 35 If
an arbitrageur is constrained to having access to only the
market index and a risk-free instrument to devise an optimal
zero-net-investment arbitrage portfolio, then the risk of the
resulting optimal arbitrage portfolio is the standard
idiosyncratic risk. For our notion of ex ante or ex post arbitrage
risk, however, we model the arbitrageur as optimally choosing
the components of the arbitrage portfolio from the universe of
the market index and all exchange-listed U.S. common stocks,
based on financial data on the returns of the stock of interest,
all candidate securities, and the risk-free instrument over the
measurement period. Then, given the optimal choice of the
components of the arbitrage portfolio, and the risk-free
instrument, we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal
hedge ratios under a zero-net-investment constraint. The risk
of this optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the
stock, our negative proxy for market efficiency. Our interviews
with traders “in the trenches” confirm this overall structure of
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FINANCE 425 (1964); Harry
Markowitz, The Early History of Portfolio Theory: 1600–1960, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 5 (1999); Merton H. Miller, The History of Finance, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., 95
(1999).
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hedging behavior by arbitrageurs. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya
construct a similar notion of arbitrage risk, but their substitute
securities are selected from similarities in product market
characteristics. 36
We thus develop a practical and general (negative) proxy
for market efficiency by quantifying the arbitrage risk
associated with each individual security.
This simple
(negative) proxy for market efficiency then allows for an
examination of a variety of factors that have been proffered by
economists and lawyers as affecting market efficiency.
We calculate the arbitrage risk of a stock over a defined
relevant period as follows:
We select the relevant period, which can be a day, a week,
a court-determined “class” period, or other time frame of
relevance (simply for presentation in this paper, we have
chosen annual periods).
We choose a period immediately prior to the relevant
period as the measurement period, because the arbitrageur
would not have had access to relevant-period data at the
beginning of the relevant period (also for simplicity, we have
chosen the year prior to the relevant period as the
measurement period).
On the basis of the measurement period, we determine the
lowest risk portfolio that an arbitrageur would use to benefit
from mispricing, as explained above. We call this portfolio the
arbitrage portfolio for the stock.
The ex ante (or baseline) arbitrage risk of the security for
the relevant period is the risk of the arbitrage portfolio over
the relevant period.
If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different
measurement period—e.g., if the period of interest
immediately follows an initial public offering—then we can do
the calculations where the measurement period is the same as
the relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk
of the security for the relevant period. For this paper, we focus
on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage risk, but we do sensitivity
analyses with ex post arbitrage risk as another negative proxy
for market efficiency.
Consider a stock that is underpriced (overpriced)
according to the information available to an arbitrageur. In
36. Jeffrey Wurgler and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten
Demand Curves for Stocks, 75 J. BUS. 583, 592–93 (2002).
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order to exploit this profitable opportunity, the arbitrageur will
construct the following arbitrage portfolio with zero net
investment, thereby reaping arbitrage profits when closing out
the investment portfolio:
Arbitrage numerator: go long (short) on the mispriced
stock; let’s say by $1 (purely a normalization).
Other arbitrage legs:
Go short (long) on N other securities. We use N = 5 legs
for the baseline model, but the results do not change
qualitatively with values of N = 10 or 20.
Go short (long) on the risk-free asset.
The total amount on these legs has to add up to $1 short
(long).
How much to go short (long) on each leg is called the
corresponding Hedge Ratio. 37
The risk of a portfolio over a period is defined as the
standard deviation of daily returns of the portfolio over that
period. Since the arbitrageur does not have access to all
relevant period data at the beginning of the relevant period,
we choose a period immediately prior to the relevant period as
the measurement period, and the arbitrage portfolio is selected
to minimize the risk (i.e., the standard deviation of daily
returns) of the arbitrage portfolio 38 over the measurement
period, with the requirement described above that the
arbitrage portfolio require zero investment. The risk of the
arbitrage portfolio over the relevant period is the arbitrage risk
of the stock for the relevant period. For this paper:
We measure arbitrage risk for U.S. exchange-listed
common stocks,
We consider only U.S. exchange-listed common stocks, and
the S&P 500 index, as candidate legs of the hedge portfolio,
and
We use daily returns on six-month U.S. Treasury bills as
the daily risk-free rate. 39
Table 2 shows examples of exchange-listed stocks and
their estimated market efficiency percentiles in 2010, on the
37. Id. at 593 (providing the computational simplification used here).
38. “Arbitrageurs generally construct hedge portfolios to minimize the total
risk of the portfolio.” HARRIS, supra note 6, at 348.
39. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Selected Interest Rates
(Daily),
FEDERAL
RESERVE
STATISTICAL
RELEASE
H.15,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last updated Feb. 18,
2015).
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basis of our measure of arbitrage risks of all U.S. exchangelisted common stocks.
Table 2: Examples of Market Efficiency Percentiles in 2010

Ticker

Company

Market
Efficiency
Percentile

ADP

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC

100

BRK

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL

100

DUK

DUKE ENERGY CORP NEW

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

100

HNZ

HEINZ H J CO

100

JNJ

JOHNSON & JOHNSON

100

JW

WILEY JOHN & SONS INC

100

MO

ALTRIA GROUP INC

100

NST

NSTAR

100

ADM

ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO

91

CAT

CATERPILLAR INC

91

CSCO

CISCO SYSTEMS INC

91

EMC

E M C CORP MA

91

BLK

BLACKROCK INC

81

CBT
ENDP

CABOT CORP
ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS
INC

GPS

GAP INC

81

AMZN

AMAZON COM INC

80

AXP

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO

80

ACF

AMERICREDIT CORP

51

CIEN

CIENA CORP

51

COBZ

COBIZ FINANCIAL INC

51

CPHD

CEPHEID

51

DAL

DELTA AIR LINES INC

51

ACAT

ARCTIC CAT INC

26

APKT

ACME PACKET INC

26

ARTW

ARTS WAY MANUFACTURING INC

26

ATAC

A T C TECHNOLOGY CORP

26

AVII

A V I BIOPHARMA INC

26

TEAR

OCCULOGIX INC

1

81
HLDNGS
81
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TRANS LUX CORP

1

TSTR

TERRESTAR CORP

1

VNDA

VANDA PHARMACEUTICALS INC

1

ZANE

ZANETT INC

1
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Table 3 demonstrates that different stocks display
different patterns of market efficiency across time.
Table 3: Examples of Market Efficiency Percentiles Over
Time

Ticke
r

Company Name

Year

Market
Efficienc
y
Percentil
e

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2001

96

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2002

83

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2003

95

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2004

68

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2005

46

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2006

54

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2007

60

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2008

68

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2009

47

ALG

ALAMO GROUP INC

2010

58

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2001

2

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2002

3

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2003

3

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2004

1

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2005

2

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2006

1

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2007

1

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2008

1

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2009

3

CNLG

CONOLOG CORP

2010

2

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2001

100
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ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2002

98

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2003

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2004

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2005

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2006

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2007

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2008

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2009

100

ED

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC

2010

100

2001

100

2002

100

2003

91

2004

97

2005

94

2006

95

2007

40

2008

3

2009

3

FRE

FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP
FEDERAL
CORP

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2001

55

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2002

89

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2003

92

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2004

96

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2005

98

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2006

87

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2007

95

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2008

95

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2009

89

MSFT

MICROSOFT CORP

2010

95

FRE
FRE
FRE
FRE
FRE
FRE
FRE
FRE

HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
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RELATION OF ARBITRAGE RISK TO STANDARD
FACTORS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

We test the empirical relation with arbitrage risk (as a
negative proxy for market efficiency) of factors relied upon by
courts and others as determinants of market efficiency. 40 This
is done for all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988
(the year of the landmark Basic decision detailed in Part I) to
2010, the last year for which we have full data, with the
following restrictions.
We restricted attention to stock-year combinations
consisting of stocks that had one PERMNO, one ticker, and one
CUSIP over the year in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Database. We utilized each stock
available from CRSP, 41 for which the following data exist for at
least 75% of trading days during each of the relevant and
measurement periods:
• Returns
• Shares outstanding
• Trading volume
• Closing bid
• Closing ask
• Exchange membership
• Number of market makers.
To include a particular stock in our analysis, we also
required data to be available for:
• The number of securities analysts (from I/B/E/S)
• Insider holdings (from Thomson Reuters)
• Institutional holdings (from Thomson Reuters)
• Inclusion in (or exclusion from) the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) index (from Phyllis
Pierce, The Dow Jones Averages 1885–1995).
Appendix 1 shows the number of stocks at the various
stages after imposing the restrictions described above.
From this data, we develop measures for the various

40. See generally Brad Barber, Paul A. Griffin & Baruch Lev, The Fraud-onthe-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, J. CORP. L.
285 (1994) (using a different proxy).
41. shrcd = 10 or 11 in the Daily Stock Database from the Center for Research
in Security Prices.
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factors that courts and others have relied upon as influencing
market efficiency. These measures are each defined below.
• Turnover: mean daily turnover (volume)/(shares
outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Number of security analysts: number of security
analysts who announced at least one projection
about the security during the relevant period.
• Number of market makers for Nasdaq stocks:
highest, over the relevant period, of the number of
market makers on each day.
• Market capitalization: mean of daily logarithm of
market capitalization over the relevant year.
• Bid-ask spread: mean of daily relative spread
(closing ask − closing bid)/(closing price) over the
relevant period.
• Public float ratio: mean of quarterly public float
ratio (shares outstanding − insider holdings)/
(shares outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Institutional
ownership
ratio:
institutional
ownership ratio (institutional holdings)/(shares
outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Serial correlation in CAPM: By performing the
Durbin-Watson Test on the CAPM on daily returns
for a stock for a calendar year, we obtain the pvalue for positive serial correlation and the p-value
for negative serial correlation. 42 The negative of
the minimum of these p-values is a positive
measure of serial correlation in the CAPM for the
particular stock for the relevant year.
• Explanatory power of CAPM: R2 of the CAPM for
the security in the relevant period.
• Inclusion in the DJIA: If a stock is on the DJIA for
an entire year, the indicator variable for that stock
for that year is one. If a stock is not on the DJIA
for an entire year, the indicator variable for that
stock for that year is zero. If a stock is on the DJIA
for only part of the year, the observation for that
stock for that year is deleted from the regression.
Summary statistics for arbitrage risk and for each of the
explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 2.
For this paper, we perform a reduced-form regression of
42. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000).
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arbitrage risk 43 on various factors of market efficiency,
controlling for year. The results of this regression—which uses
35,587 observations (stock-years) and has R2 = 0.463 and
adjusted R2 = 0.462 (see Appendix 3)—are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Detailed Regression Results
Dependent Variable:
Arbitrage Risk

Factor

Under Homoscedasticity

Heteroscedasticity-Robust

Standard

t-

Standard

t-

p-

Coefficient

Error

Statistic

p-Value

Error

Statistic

Value

74.366%

3.881%

19.160

<0.0001

6.286%

11.830

<0.0001

0.006%

0.004%

1.770

0.077

0.002%

3.100

0.0019

0.019%

0.003%

5.780

<0.0001

0.004%

4.880

<0.0001

-0.406%

0.032%

-12.880

<0.0001

0.043%

-9.360

<0.0001

48.975%

1.750%

27.980

<0.0001

9.077%

5.400

<0.0001

-0.821%

0.179%

-4.600

<0.0001

0.880%

-0.930

0.3508

-0.629%

0.138%

-4.560

<0.0001

0.142%

-4.420

<0.0001

-0.423%

0.195%

-2.170

0.03

0.148%

-2.860

0.0042

-1.411%

0.280%

-5.040

<0.0001

0.166%

-8.520

<0.0001

1.030%

0.295%

3.490

0.0005

0.136%

7.550

<0.0001

Cammer v.
Bloom
Turnover
Number of
Analysts
Number of
Nasdaq
Market
Makers
Unger v.
Amidesys
Market
Capitalization
Bid-Ask
Spread
Public Float
Ratio
Other
Institutional
Ownership
Ratio
Serial
Correlation
Explanatory
Power
Inclusion in
Dow Jones
Index

43. It is worth noting again that, ceteris paribus, market efficiency has a
negative relation with arbitrage risk.
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Listed on
NYSE

0.467%

0.145%

3.220

0.0013

0.153%

3.040

0.0024

-0.351%

0.163%

-2.150

0.0314

0.112%

-3.150

0.0016

Exchange

0.800%

2.255%

0.350

0.7227

0.640%

1.250

0.2113

Year 1988

6.788%

0.571%

11.890

<0.0001

0.878%

7.730

<0.0001

Year 1989

7.640%

0.550%

13.900

<0.0001

0.872%

8.760

<0.0001

Year 1990

12.130%

0.563%

21.550

<0.0001

1.267%

9.570

<0.0001

Year 1991

45.566%

0.568%

80.230

<0.0001

4.618%

9.870

<0.0001

Year 1992

11.421%

0.464%

24.610

<0.0001

0.976%

11.700

<0.0001

Year 1993

6.968%

0.457%

15.240

<0.0001

0.850%

8.190

<0.0001

Year 1994

6.826%

0.449%

15.210

<0.0001

0.852%

8.010

<0.0001

Year 1995

6.743%

0.447%

15.070

<0.0001

0.853%

7.910

<0.0001

Year 1996

7.066%

0.444%

15.920

<0.0001

0.856%

8.260

<0.0001

Year 1997

7.381%

0.439%

16.830

<0.0001

0.852%

8.670

<0.0001

Listed on
AMEX
Listed on
Other

Year 1998

7.968%

0.433%

18.420

<0.0001

0.848%

9.400

<0.0001

Year 1999

7.966%

0.437%

18.210

<0.0001

0.856%

9.300

<0.0001

Year 2000

8.747%

0.436%

20.070

<0.0001

0.859%

10.180

<0.0001

Year 2001

8.742%

0.424%

20.610

<0.0001

0.840%

10.400

<0.0001

Year 2002

8.539%

0.414%

20.620

<0.0001

0.830%

10.290

<0.0001

Year 2003

7.963%

0.412%

19.330

<0.0001

0.819%

9.730

<0.0001

Year 2004

7.801%

0.417%

18.730

<0.0001

0.823%

9.480

<0.0001

Year 2005

7.694%

0.416%

18.480

<0.0001

0.823%

9.340

<0.0001

Year 2006

7.684%

0.415%

18.510

<0.0001

0.824%

9.320

<0.0001

Year 2007

8.080%

0.411%

19.650

<0.0001

0.825%

9.800

<0.0001

Year 2008

9.465%

0.399%

23.710

<0.0001

0.828%

11.430

<0.0001

Year 2009

9.677%

0.393%

24.630

<0.0001

0.823%

11.760

<0.0001

Year 2010

7.928%

0.396%

20.010

<0.0001

0.820%

9.670

<0.0001

As with the results summarized in Table 1, we checked the
sensitivity of these results through a number of additional
analyses. For one set, we replaced turnover with logarithm of
volume (or logarithm of dollar volume) but removed market
capitalization from the list of factors, reflecting the fact that,
ceteris paribus, the volume for a stock with higher market
capitalization will be higher. For this set, we found that the
results were the same as in Table 4, except that arbitrage risk
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was negatively and significantly affected by number of
analysts; negatively but insignificantly affected by number of
market makers (for Nasdaq stocks); negatively but
ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and negatively and
significantly affected by inclusion in the DJIA (the latter
makes sense because in this set, market capitalization is not
used as an explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for
the results in Table 4). The second set uses only the Cammer
factors as explanatory variables. For this set, we found that
the results were the same as in Table 4, except that arbitrage
risk is negatively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of
volume (or logarithm of dollar volume); and negatively and
significantly affected by number of analysts.
A. Trading Volume
The positive relation of trading volume or turnover with
market efficiency is often considered almost axiomatic—
statements such as “the more thinly traded the stock, the less
efficient the market is” are common. However, this is not
necessarily the case. 44 In order to appreciate how trading
volume (or turnover) is often misunderstood, we need to
appreciate that:
[I]nvestors trade among themselves because they are
different. . . . The difference in their response to the same
information generates trading.
The greater the
information asymmetry, the larger the abnormal trading
volume when public news arrives. 45

We would observe higher trading volume or turnover in
the market for an asset if and only if: 46
1) Transaction costs (including bid-ask spread,
commissions, and search costs) are low relative to

44. See also MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (2nd ed.
1997); Lawrence Blume, David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Market Statistics and
Technical Analysis: The Role of Volume, 49 J. FIN. 153 (1994); Jonathan Karpoff,
The Relation Between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A Survey, 22 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 109 (1987); Erik R. Sirri, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Michael
A. Goldstein, Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate
Bonds, 20 REV. FIN. STUDIES 235 (2007); and Scott E. Stickel & Robert E.
Verrecchia, Evidence that Trading Volume Sustains Stock Price Changes, 50 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 57 (1994).
45. Jiang Wang, A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 127, 128–29 (1994).
46. See Rajeev Bhattacharya, Structural Models of Market Efficiency, MIMEO
(2012), for detailed derivations.
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dispersion in investor valuations.
2) Low-valuers hold more securities than highvaluers, and short sales costs are low relative to
dispersion in investor valuations.
Higher trading volume will therefore be observed with:
• Lower transaction costs,
• Lower short sales costs,
• Higher dispersion of investor valuations, and/or
• Higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset.
Clearly, market efficiency would be facilitated by lower
transaction costs and lower short sales costs—and when a
claim is made about higher trading volume being a factor
favoring market efficiency, it is often implicitly based on this
argument. However, there is no reason to conclude that,
ceteris paribus, a higher dispersion in investor valuations, or a
higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset, would lead
to higher market efficiency. 47
Given these contrary dependencies, the relation of market
efficiency with turnover is fundamentally an empirical
question, and our empirical finding, for all U.S. exchangelisted common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 48 is that turnover
negatively and significantly affects market efficiency.
B. The Number of Market Makers
From the above discussion, we can see that the demand for
market making services in a Nasdaq stock is an increasing
function of dispersion in investor valuations—i.e., everything
else remaining the same, a firm is more likely to be a market
maker in a Nasdaq stock if the investor valuation profile for
that stock is more dispersed, because there would be more
trades to enable more profits.
However, the higher the number of market makers, the
higher the competition for trades would be, and this would
reduce the transaction costs of trades. Therefore, a higher
number of market makers would be observed with higher
dispersion (not unambiguously facilitating market efficiency,
as shown above) and/or lower transaction cost (facilitating
market efficiency).

47. With high dispersion in investor valuations, we can have a high trading
volume (much of which can be due to noise trading), and a higher dispersion in
investor valuations does not necessarily add to the efficiency of a market.
48. Restrictions are detailed at the beginning of Section 3.
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Therefore, as above, the relation between the number of
Nasdaq market makers and market efficiency is
fundamentally empirical, and our empirical finding, for all
U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 49 is
that arbitrage risk for a Nasdaq stock is positively and
significantly related to the number of market makers for that
stock; and that market efficiency for a Nasdaq stock is
negatively and significantly related to the number of market
makers for that stock.
C. Serial Correlation
Serial correlation in the CAPM of a stock’s daily returns,
suggesting a day-to-day pattern of repeated performance, and
is often considered evidence of market inefficiencies. Some
scholars have suggested other explanations 50 of serial
correlation that are consistent with market efficiency. In the
presence of such inconsistent findings, this dependence
becomes an empirical question. Our empirical findings suggest
that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks
from 1988 to 2010, 51 serial correlation affects market efficiency
positively and significantly.
D. Other Factors
The number of securities analysts is a Cammer factor, and
other courts have suggested using public float as a factor
favorable to a finding of market efficiency. Our empirical
findings suggest that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed
common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 52 the number of securities
analysts and public float have an ambiguous impact on market
efficiency.
Consistent with the position taken by courts and others,
we find that market capitalization and institutional ownership
have significant empirical support based on our analysis. The
bid-ask spread of a stock, which is a measure of transaction
cost of a stock, has been used by courts as a factor inhibiting
market efficiency, and our results confirm this position, too.

49. Id.
50. Ray Ball & S.P. Kothari, Nonstationary Expected Returns: Implications
for Tests of Market Efficiency and Serial Correlation in Returns, 25 J. FIN. ECON.
51 (1989).
51. Restrictions are detailed at the beginning of Section 3.
52. Id.
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Although we have not found a court ruling where the
inclusion of the relevant stock in a major index is a factor
favorable to a finding of market efficiency, expert reports and
testimony commonly use such an argument. It is interesting
to note, however, that because we control for market
capitalization, what the indicator variable corresponding to
membership in the DJIA measures is purely how much the
inclusion of the stock in the DJIA adds to the efficiency of the
market for the stock, over and above what the stock’s market
capitalization predicts. We find, for all U.S. exchange-listed
common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 53 that inclusion in the DJIA,
over and above its size, significantly reduces the efficiency of
the market for its stock.
It should be noted that these results are robust to
alterations in the statistical model. We performed sensitivity
analyses with a) ex post arbitrage risk, b) sign constraints on
the correlations of returns in the determination of legs of the
arbitrage portfolio, c) sign constraints on the hedge ratios, d)
number of legs in the arbitrage portfolio, and e) the risk-free
rate. The empirical findings are qualitatively the same as for
the baseline regressions.
CONCLUSIONS
We discuss arbitrage risk, a negative proxy for market
efficiency based on financial economics, and show how it can
be applied to securities class actions.
We also test the dependence of arbitrage risk on various
standard factors used by courts in the determination of market
efficiency. Some of these empirical findings do not seem
consistent with “conventional wisdom”—as Warren Buffett is
famously supposed to have said, “Well, it may be all right in
practice, but it will never work in theory.” However, we
suggest that our empirical findings are actually consistent
with economic theory.
The list of determinants of market efficiency considered in
this paper is not exhaustive.
Academic research and
interviews with financial practitioners have suggested
additional factors such as external and internal regulations,
and industrial organization (including supply and demand
structures) of product markets. We intend to utilize data on

53. Id.

2015] ARBITRAGE RISK & MARKET EFFICIENCY

669

industry codes, and industry properties such as pricing and
concentration, to analyze these additional factors affecting
market efficiency.
Cammer Factor (5)—the cause-and-effect relationship
between material disclosures and changes in the security’s
price—is typically analyzed using event studies, which are
joint tests of market efficiency and significance of particular
events. 54 Using summaries of such event studies as proxies for
market efficiency in the context of a macro-analysis like ours
would be possible only with substantial simplifications/
assumptions such as restricting our attention to earnings
announcements different from consensus analyst forecasts as
the only surprises for a stock. We intend to undertake such an
analysis in the future.
Finally, we propose to investigate alternative proxies for
market efficiency such as put-call parity of options on the
security of interest in order to test the robustness of our results
across varying measures of market efficiency.

35.

54. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, ET AL., supra note 30; and Pontiff, supra note 7, at
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Appendix 1: Number of Unique Stock-Year Combinations
With
Calendar
Year
Trading
Restrictions

After
Mergers
with
Other
Data

Year

All

With Unique
PERMNO, Ticker,
and CUSIP in
Calendar Year

All
Years

141,591

131,779

106,585

37,111

1988

5,323

4,839

4,040

538

1989

4,980

4,633

4,053

578

1990

4,772

4,454

3,923

585

1991

4,843

4,523

3,901

610

1992

6,434

5,973

4,669

652

1993

6,976

6,450

4,911

754

1994

7,367

6,871

5,160

866

1995

7,757

7,170

5,507

990

1996

8,282

7,606

5,605

1,098

1997

8,468

7,710

5,781

1,237

1998

8,254

7,544

5,869

1,415

1999

7,917

7,218

5,551

1,542

2000

7,528

6,835

5,198

1,646

2001

6,692

6,252

5,016

1,765

2002

5,955

5,562

4,850

1,917

2003

5,497

5,231

4,535

2,034

2004

5,286

5,032

4,314

2,185

2005

5,228

4,976

4,162

2,379

2006

5,179

4,893

4,085

2,619

2007

5,155

4,891

3,993

2,859

2008

4,843

4,591

3,923

2,900

2009

4,533

4,343

3,871

3,040

2010

4,322

4,182

3,668

2,902
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Appendix 3: Summary Regression Results
Number of Observations Read

37,111

Number of Observations Used
Number of Observations with
Missing Values

35,587

Source

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares
(SS)

Model

36

Error
Uncorrected
Total

R2

0.463

Adjusted R2

0.462

1,524

Mean SS

FStatistic

pValue

93.1478

2.58744

851.3

<0.00
01

35,551

108.0536

0.00304

35,587

201.2014

